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Abstract 
 
The argument of this paper is that social psychological models of collective action do 
not (and cannot) adequately explain social change and collective action through models 
based on shared variance between variables. Over and above the questions of why and 
how collective action and social change occur, such models do not adequately address 
the question of when they occur: At what point on a measure of perceived illegitimacy – 
or any other predictor – does a person decide that enough is enough, and at what point 
do shared grievances transform into mass protest? Instead, it is argued that the transition 
from inaction to action at the level of both the individual and the group is better 
conceptualised as a qualitative transformation. A key agenda for the social psychology 
of collective action should therefore be to conceptualise the link between quantitative 
variation in predictors of action, and the actual emergence of action.  
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Why the psychology of collective action requires qualitative transformation as well as 
quantitative change. 
 
“Relatively few phenomena are that orderly or well behaved; on the contrary, the world 
is full of sudden transformations and unpredictable divergences” (Zeeman, 1976, p.65). 
 
“The ‘transformation of quantity to quality’ defends a systems-based view of change 
that translates incremental inputs into alterations of state” (Gould, 1987, p.154). 
 
The aim of this paper is to critically consider whether social psychological models of 
collective action adequately explain the emergence of collective action and protest. Its 
core argument is that these models, to the extent that they focus on shared variance 
between variables, underplay the qualitative transformations involved when people 
decide as individuals and communities that enough is enough. That is, as with any 
action, there is a point at which it emerges, both at the level of the individual and at the 
collective level of a community or social movement. In other words, the emergence of 
action involves a transformation of form; a transition that involves discontinuous change 
as one acts by signing a petition, attending a rally or smashing a window, rather than 
doing nothing or doing something else. The question posed in this article is whether 
social psychological models sufficiently address this aspect of collective action – that is, 
can they tell us something about the point at which protest emerges? 
While it touches upon a number of different perspectives and academic 
disciplines, the initial impetus for this article actually came from media coverage of 
collective action, and particularly the way in which journalists so frequently employ 
metaphors of heat and temperature when describing collective action and mass events. 
This is especially so when these events involve physical confrontation and violence. 
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Accordingly, tensions between groups ‘simmer’ before ‘boiling over’; anger ‘explodes’; 
violence ‘erupts’; riots are ‘sparked’. Correspondingly, tensions ‘cool’ as the likelihood 
of confrontation dissipates. The metaphor is also extended into discussions of the 
underlying structural, economic, cultural, political and historical conditions of conflict, 
which turn a region or a situation into a ‘powder keg’ or a ‘tinderbox’, ready to burn or 
explode should someone be so careless or cruel as to ‘light the fuse’. 
Social psychological predictors of collective action 
As a social psychologist with a dedicated interest in understanding the causes 
and consequences of collective action, it is tempting to dismiss these journalistic tropes 
as the clichéd language of individuals who have little grasp of (or worse, no inclination 
to grasp) the complexity, meaning, and explicability of social action (Bassel, 2012; 
Philo & Berry, 2004). This is especially so in view of the recent proliferation of 
research into the social psychological predictors of collective action, which has 
advanced our understanding of the factors that lead people to engage in protest. Much of 
this work draws on classic theories in intergroup relations which emphasise the role of 
perceiving our group as being relatively deprived (relative deprivation theory; Crosby, 
1976; Walker & Mann, 1987; Walker & Smith 2002) or as having lower status (social 
identity theory; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) compared to a relevant outgroup. Importantly, 
this disadvantage must be appraised in terms of group memberships and social 
identification, rather than in terms of interpersonal comparison. That is, our relatively 
deprived position must be fraternal, rather than egoistic (Crosby, 1976). 
 When group-level social comparison does reveal a deficit, a number of factors 
help to determine whether we seek to engage in action that will rectify it. For example, 
partaking in collective action is more likely when we subjectively identify with the 
group in question (Kelly, 1993; Simon et al., 1998). This is especially so when the 
identity relates to a specific social movement rather than the more abstract social 
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category (Simon et al., 1998), and when the identity has been ‘politicised’ (Simon & 
Klandermans, 2001). Other appraisals of the nature of the status difference are also 
important, not least of all in terms of whether it is perceived as fair or unjust (see Van 
Zomeren et al., 2008). Thus, researchers drawing on social identity theory have 
emphasised the importance of the perceived illegitimacy of an ingroup’s low status 
(e.g., Ellemers, Wilke, & Van Knippenberg, 1993; Bettencourt, Dor, Charlton, & Hume, 
2001), while relative deprivation theory emphasises the importance of felt entitlement as 
a driver of action against one’s relative deprivation (Crosby, 1976). 
 While legitimacy and entitlement reflect a sense that collective action is proper 
or appropriate, other factors relate to whether such action is seen as possible. Relevant 
concepts here include the perceived stability of status differences from social identity 
theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Ellemers et al., 1993), and the perceived feasibility of 
challenges to inequality from relative deprivation theory (Crosby, 1976; Walker & 
Smith, 2002). Within models of collective action, a sense of collective (as opposed to 
individual) efficacy has been found to increase collective action tendencies (see Van 
Zomeren et al., 2008 for a review), while research on the elaborated social identity 
model of crowd behaviour (Reicher, 1996) has highlighted the importance of 
experiences of empowerment in collective behaviour, both as a dynamic outcome of 
participation in collective action and as a driver of future participation (Drury & 
Reicher, 1999; 2005). 
 In addition to drawing on classic theories of intergroup behaviour, social 
psychological models of collective action have also provided a fresh take on 
predominant ‘rationalist’ accounts of motives for collective action participation, based 
on cost-benefit calculations (see Olson, 1965). Klandermans (1997) differentiates 
between a reward motive for collective action participation, reflecting the expected 
value and cost of participation for the individual, and a social motive for participation.  
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This social motive is conceptualised in terms of the expected reactions of important 
others (family; friends) to one’s participation – a distinct set of concerns to those based 
on individual utility. 
 Finally, the development of intergroup emotion theory (Smith, 1993; see Iyer & 
Leach, 2008 for a review) has further stimulated the integration of emotion into social 
psychological theories of collective action (see also Runciman, 1966). Drawing on 
appraisal theories of emotion (e.g., Lazarus, 1991), various studies have shown how 
different appraisals of a context give rise to particular emotions. Appraising one’s 
ingroup’s disadvantage as illegitimate thus gives rise to anger (Van Zomeren et al., 
2004), while appraising an ingroup’s past actions as illegitimate can give rise to 
collective guilt or shame (Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007). These group-based 
emotions in turn influence specific action intentions: for example, anger predicts a 
desire to engage in collective action (Van Zomeren et al., 2004), shame predicts a desire 
to withdraw from a conflict (Iyer et al., 2007), and contempt predicts an orientation 
towards more radical or illegal forms of protest (Tausch et al., 2011). Other emotions 
shape collective action by inhibiting tendencies towards protest. These inhibitory 
emotions include both negative emotions such as fear (Miller, Cronin, Garcia, & 
Branscombe, 2009), and positive emotions such as admiration (Sweetman, Spears, 
Livingstone, & Manstead, 2013). 
Temperature gauge? Quantifying collective action. 
Of particular relevance to the present argument is that most of the developments 
described above have, with some exceptions (e.g., Drury and Reicher, 1999; 2005), 
involved methods and data that are amenable to quantitative analyses. This has 
numerous benefits, not least of all in allowing complex models to be tested, and the 
contribution of individual factors to be pinpointed. The result is that we have a sense not 
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only of the range of factors that matter in predicting collective action, but also of their 
relative predictive value when taking other factors into account.  
It is helpful to illustrate this in relation to perceived illegitimacy, one of the most 
prominent factors in models of collective action. Many studies have found a direct 
association between illegitimacy perceptions and collective action tendencies (e.g., 
Ellemers et al., 1993; Livingstone et al., 2009). As noted above, illegitimacy is also the 
main appraisal which has been found to produce intergroup anger, which in turn 
predicts collective action tendencies and behaviour (Mackie et al., 2000; Van Zomeren 
et al., 2004). Other research has examined how the strength of the link between 
illegitimacy and anger also depends on other concurrent appraisals, such as a perceived 
threat to one’s ingroup’s identity (Livingstone et al., 2009).  
Quantifying illegitimacy has also allowed its role across a large number of 
studies to be assessed. Van Zomeren et al.’s (2008) meta-analysis found support for 
their social identity model of collective action (SIMCA), in which illegitimacy is rooted 
in social identity, and plays a distinct predictive role to that played by collective 
efficacy. Moreover, as is clear in the model illustrated in Figure 1, this quantitative 
synthesis allows specific effect sizes to be estimated for each link in the model, 
providing a clear indication of the magnitude of the association between illegitimacy 
and its antecedents and consequences. When used to predict similarly-measured 
outcomes such as collective action tendencies, a continuous measure of illegitimacy (or 
any construct) enables us to gauge whether it is a statistically significant predictor of the 
outcome, the magnitude of its effect (e.g., the effect of a unit increase in illegitimacy on 
collective action tendencies), and the amount of variance in the outcome that is 
explained by illegitimacy. 
Quantitative change and qualitative transformation   8 
 
Quantitative change and qualitative transformation 
On the basis of this brief review, it is tempting to assert that social psychological 
models have done a very good job of explaining collective action, especially relative to 
lay characterisations of protest and collective conflict as abrupt, out-of-nowhere 
eruptions of frustration. From here on, however, I want to suggest that there is another 
sense in which these models have not done such a good job at explaining collective 
action.  
The issue here is that the statistical association between illegitimacy and 
intentions to protest (for example) begs a number of other questions about the 
emergence of collective action. Not least of these is that of how much illegitimacy is 
required for a person to go from abstaining to engaging in an act of protest. At what 
point on a scale of illegitimacy would a person go from doing nothing to doing 
something? When is a unit increase in perceived illegitimacy enough to instigate an act 
of protest? The same question can be asked in relation to genuinely collective 
behaviours: At what point in their emerging sense of injustice does a community or 
nascent social movement go from not acting to acting? The more general point is that 
for any collective action – and indeed, for any intentional act at all – there is a point at 
which it emerges, when an individual goes from doing nothing to doing something, or 
shifts from doing one thing to doing something else. Likewise, the development and 
behaviour of social movements and less structured groups involves not just variance in 
their collective action intentions and behaviour, but the transition from not acting to 
acting, and transitions between different types and targets of action.  
These points also echo the apparent abruptness with which events such as the 
recent revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, or the riots in England in 2011 
developed. These events were clearly precipitated by much longer term structural 
factors, coupled with the preparedness of activist individuals and networks – however 
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loosely constituted and otherwise invisible to outsiders – to seize opportunities to act 
(Reicher & Stott, 2011). The psychological factors discussed above – collective 
identity; disadvantage; illegitimacy; emerging efficacy; emotions – are also quite clearly 
central to explaining such events. Nevertheless, to frame an explanation of such events 
in terms of high levels of illegitimacy, or any other variable or combination of variables, 
is to dodge other important questions: Why there? Why then?  
The key argument of this paper is therefore that social psychological models of 
collective action in one sense offer compelling explanations for collective action and 
protest, but in another sense explain little about the actual emergence of action. That is, 
they say little about when qualitative, discontinuous change occurs in the outcome. The 
very fact of the transition between inaction and action (or vice versa) indicates that such 
discontinuous change is a fundamental feature of collective action both at the level of 
the individual and the group, yet the relationship between this change and underlying 
psychological variables has largely been ignored in favour of analyses that focus on 
explaining quantitative variance in measures of collective action (a point that echoes the 
more general limitations of ‘arbitrary metrics’ – measures whose meaning is unclear in 
terms of absolute levels of a variable – in psychology; Blanton & Jaccard, 2006). In 
short, at some point on our scales of illegitimacy or any other predictor, something 
happens. 
It is probably useful at this point to be clear about what this argument is not. For 
one thing, it is not a simple call for greater statistical sophistication, at least not in and 
of itself (the potential contribution of complex modelling will be discussed further 
below; see Smith & Conrey, 2007). This is important because it could be countered that 
quantitative analyses of collective action are more nuanced and sophisticated than the 
sketch presented here. One might argue, for example, that the link between perceived 
illegitimacy and collective action can be more fully articulated through examining 
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moderation (interaction) effects, non-linear effects, and effects on behavioural outcomes 
rather than measured intentions to engage in protest. However, far from addressing the 
issue of how quantitative variation translates into qualitative transformations in 
outcomes, these practices in and of themselves only recapitulate it in different terms. 
For example, one might specify that the linear effect of illegitimacy (or whatever) might 
be different depending on another variable (e.g., Ellemers et al., 1993; Livingstone et 
al., 2009; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner & Brown, 1978), but this again fails to identify 
the point at which action emerges on any of the simple regression slopes that could be 
drawn. Likewise, a curvilinear effect simply suggests that the effect of a unit change in 
a predictor is different at different levels of itself, producing increasingly or 
decreasingly large quantitative change in the outcome without specification of where on 
the outcome scale (or indeed, the predictor scale) action might be expected to emerge.  
Lastly, while behavioural measures, such as whether or not a participant signed 
a petition (e.g., Sweetman et al., 2013), are something of a gold standard when it comes 
to gauging outcomes, their relation to predictors is usually indicated by an odds ratio 
which indicates the probability that a individual falls into one category or another (i.e., 
whether they signed the petition or not). An odds ratio can thus indicate the likelihood 
that an individual will engage in a behaviour following a unit increase in a predictor 
(see Tabachnik & Fidel, 2012), but not how much of that predictor is necessary to 
engender a shift from one outcome category to another – that is, to go from not signing 
a petition to signing a petition, or from performing a legal act of protest to performing 
an illegal act of protest. 
If statistical sophistication does not provide an easy way to address the 
relationship between quantitative change and qualitative transformation, it is because 
the issue is as much a question of theory as it is a question of method. That is, the roots 
of the issue lie in conceptual treatments of collective action which do not pay sufficient 
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attention to the points of transition involved in the phenomena that interest us. It should 
be made clear at this stage that the problem is not inherent to the use of the statistical 
tests discussed above. In fact, they could all be used to meaningfully help in identifying 
the point(s) at which transitions to and between action occur. The key issue, as I will 
discuss in more detail below, is the willingness to conceptualise and to try to identify 
points of transition in the first place, and to try to relate them to underlying predictors 
such as perceptions of illegitimacy.   
Quantitative change and qualitative transformation beyond social psychology 
Whatever the reason for the failure to address the emergence of collective action 
in terms of a transition or qualitative change in form, a particularly striking thing about 
that failure is just how unusual social psychology is amongst academic disciplines in 
neglecting the link between quantitative change and qualitative transformation. Turning 
first to the ‘hard’ sciences, a simple example is the notion of phase transitions between 
states of matter as a function of temperature. To state the obvious, substances not only 
get warmer or cooler: at certain points on the temperature scale, unit changes in 
temperature result in qualitative transformation as the substance boils, melts or freezes.  
Taking the freezing process from a micro to a macro level, climate change 
theory has also posited that qualitative transformation can occur in the climate as a 
result of quantitative unit changes in an input or inputs. Specifically, some theorists 
have suggested that climate change cycles occur because the equilibrium between 
positive (cooling) and negative (warming) feedback effects is altered by changes in the 
planet’s pattern of orbit (e.g., Milankovitch, 1941). The result is that at some point, a 
unit change in the planet’s orbit (however that is quantified) means that ice spread not 
only increases, but acquires a self-sustaining momentum even in the absence of change 
in the input (i.e., the pattern of orbit) – the ice-albedo feedback effect (Cubasch & Cess, 
1990).  
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The idea that large-scale transformations in phenomena can be understood in 
terms of disturbed equilibria between competing forces can also be found in other fields 
such as evolutionary biology. The theory of punctuated equilibria (Eldredge & Gould, 
1972; Gould & Eldredge, 1977) posits that evolution is characterised less by smooth, 
incremental change, and more by long periods of stasis punctuated by short, rapid bursts 
through which ‘branching’ – the emergence of new species – occurs. This pattern, 
according to the theory, reflects the negation of opposing pressures during periods of 
stasis (equilibrium) and the breaking of that equilibrium during periods of rapid change. 
At a higher level still, science itself has been characterised by Kuhn (1996) as 
developing not through steady incremental gains but through periods of stability 
followed by rapid periods of revolution – so-called ‘paradigm shifts’. 
Attempts to address sharp, qualitative change in the form of our objects of study 
are thus quite apparent in the ‘hard’ or physical sciences. Turning in the opposite 
direction from the vantage point of social psychology, it is also apparent that social 
sciences are marked by efforts to address such transformations. The notion of a ‘tipping 
point’ is a prime example. Although popularised as a metaphor for understanding the 
rapid social transmission of ideas and trends (see Gladwell, 2000), tipping points were 
initially conceptualised as a point at which a (small) input change leads to a change in 
process with self-sustaining momentum, and transformative outcomes – even in the 
absence of further changes in input. As a concrete example, tipping points were invoked 
by scholars such as Grodzins (1958) and Schelling (1971) to understand the dynamics 
of racial (de)segregation in housing in the USA. The utility of the tipping point analysis 
was in identifying that so-called ‘white flight’ did not just increase as a function of the 
number of black families moving into a predominantly white neighbourhood. Rather, 
according to Schelling, there was a point at which one additional black family moving 
into the neighbourhood would trigger a process that ultimately led to complete racial 
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segregation as white families moved out of the area, irrespective of whether more black 
families moved in.  
Turning closer to the topic of this special issue, the idea that there is a point at 
which transformative outcomes start to emerge has also characterised a number of 
approaches to the study of collective action. A case in point is the development of 
threshold models (Granovetter, 1978) which attempt to model the point at which 
individuals choose to perform a behaviour in the collective interest, as a dynamic 
function of the number of others performing the behaviour in a particular context. 
Again, the implication is that there is a point at which individuals start to act. Similar 
points can be made in relation to other sociologically-oriented theories of collective 
action, such as critical mass theory (Marwell & Oliver, 1993) or the processes of ‘frame 
alignment’ emphasised within framing theory (Benford & Snow, 2000). 
Even within social psychology itself, the issue of qualitative transformation – 
such as sudden ‘jumps’ in the occurrence of behaviours of interest – has been broached. 
For example, Klaus Scherer (2000) has argued that the link between specific emotions 
and their underlying appraisals is neither straightforward nor linear. Instead, Scherer 
argues, an important aspect of emotional phenomena such as the relationship between 
anger and frustration is instead that “with increasing frustration there may be a point 
where anger will, in a dramatic fashion, jump to a considerably higher level rather than 
continue to increase in a linear fashion” (2000, p. 89).  
In order to explain (or at least to appropriately describe) this aspect of the 
phenomenology of emotions such as anger, Scherer suggests that the relationship 
between appraisals and emotions can be represented by a particular type of non-linear 
curve characterised by hysteresis – a concept that constitutes a key element of 
catastrophe theory (Thom,1975; Zeeman, 1976), discussed further below. Figure 2 
provides an example of such a function in the case of the frustration-anger relationship. 
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As Scherer suggests, “whereas a linear function would predict steadily rising anger with 
increasing frustration, the hysteresis function, containing a folded-back, nonaccessible 
region, suggests that the intensity of anger will change abruptly for specific degrees of 
frustration” (2000, p.88-89). 
Clarifications 
 It should be made clear at this juncture that in very briefly reviewing the various 
theories above, there is no claim that all (or any) of them are necessarily right. Indeed, 
many have been subject to sustained critique and remain controversial in their fields. 
But independently of their specific explanatory value, their value in the present context 
is quite simply that in their different ways, they directly address a fundamental feature 
of the phenomena under study: the existence of points of transition or qualitative change 
in form, and their relationship to incremental quantitative variation in inputs. 
 Another point to make clear here is that in arguing for the need to study points 
of qualitative transformation in order to adequately explain collective action, it is not the 
case that this should necessarily supersede or replace the linear, quantitative, shared 
variance approaches reviewed at the beginning of this article. More generally, it is not a 
question of competing perspectives or levels of analysis. This should be quite evident 
from the range of approaches covered above, each of which is underpinned by the 
quantification of inputs and (statistical) analysis of their relation – linear or otherwise – 
to the object of study. The point is that in doing so, they also recognise the existence of, 
and are theoretically concerned with, points of transition in those phenomena and their 
relationship to quantitative change in the inputs. In relation to collective action, the 
message is not that analyses based on shared variance are somehow misguided or 
necessarily of limited value. Rather, it is that such analyses signal a pre-occupation with 
the question of why collective action occurs, and that the challenge they face is to 
address the question of when it happens, as a function of explanatory factors. While it 
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was argued earlier in this article that interactive, non-linear and/or behavioural effects 
are not the answer, it should be clear that they are very much part of the answer – just 
not in and of themselves. 
The transformation of quantity to quality in collective action: Setting an agenda 
Having disparaged the journalistic cliché of heat metaphors at the outset of this 
paper, there is perhaps now a case for admitting that the implicit equation of the 
emergence of protest with a phase transition signals (unwittingly, for sure) an important 
blind spot in the social psychology of collective action. In doing so, it also sets the 
challenge of addressing that blind spot. So how can the study of collective action 
address this challenge? I have no intention of trying to offer a confident answer to this 
question here. Instead, the aim of the remainder of this article is simply to offer some 
thoughts on how to at least go about asking the right sorts of questions. 
Sticking for the moment with the applicability of heat metaphors to collective 
action, it might be tempting to treat the emergence of action in the individual and in 
groups as a simple phase transition that occurs at identifiable points on measures of 
illegitimacy, efficacy, anger etc. In short, can such measures be used as thermometers to 
indicate the ‘boiling point’ of an individual or a society? Unfortunately, the shift from 
inaction to action or from one action to another is unlikely to be tied to specific points 
on our measurement scales, or at least not straightforwardly. The issue here is that even 
for something as inanimate as water, the relationship between its boiling point and 
temperature is variable, contingent on factors such as atmospheric pressure. In the case 
of a psychological construct such as illegitimacy, its contingency on other variables is 
profound (Livingstone et al., 2009; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Added to this is the fact 
that we are agentic and sense-making beings, and always interpret and react to self-
report measures. The very act of trying to measure an individual’s subjective sense of 
illegitimacy can thus lead to unexpected and highly varied responses, further muddying 
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the link between any specific point on the scale and specific outcomes (see Blanton & 
Jaccard, 2006). 
A more fruitful approach may be to draw more general conceptual guidelines 
from other approaches that that have addressed the quantity-quality transition. For 
example, as noted above, the hysteresis concept employed by Scherer (2000) in relation 
to emotions is a key element of catastrophe theory (Thom, 1975; Zeeman, 1976). As the 
quote from Zeeman (1976) at the beginning of this article indicates, this mathematical 
approach was concerned with mapping precisely the sorts of transitions discussed here. 
Mapping these transformations as a function of underlying variation in predictors 
involves, in the simplest instance, the specification of a bifurcation set or cusp, such as 
the beginning of the fold-back curves in Figure 2. This represents the threshold(s) at 
which transformations occur. According to Zeeman, this provides a way of reconciling 
the observations that sometimes behaviour varies smoothly as a function of underlying 
predictors, but also sometimes undergoes sudden change. Importantly, more complex 
arrays of bifurcation sets can be produced as the number of inputs rises, modelling 
multiple points of transition that can occur depending on the specific levels of the 
inputs.  
Outside of the mathematical complexity of catastrophe theory, the principle that 
can be extracted for present purposes is actually quite simple: That no matter how 
quantitatively complex or nuanced our model of inputs may be, its utility is only as 
great as our concurrent description of the nature of the phenomena we seek to explain – 
including acknowledgement of its sudden transformations as well as its smooth 
variation. That is, we need to have a grasp of the form of the behaviour surface (the 
forms that protest behaviour and collective action may take, including the nature of their 
emergence), as well as the underlying variables that shape it (the underlying control 
surface, in catastrophe theory terms). As Aubin (2004) puts it, the goal of catastrophe 
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theory “was to understand natural phenomena by approaching them directly” (p.98), 
rather than beginning with the underlying inputs and inferring the form of phenomena 
from them (a one-way street to reductionism in Thom’s [1975] view). In short, there is 
value in starting with a fuller and franker characterisation of collective action and 
protest – when it happens, what happens, when it doesn’t happen, and where it all 
happens (or doesn’t happen) – and working backwards to develop an adequate 
(descriptive) model of the phenomena as they exist, in addition to the hypothetico-
deductive process that leads us to start with theoretical principles and work forward. 
It is worth noting at this point that several researchers have begun to advocate 
complex modelling techniques developed in relation to theories of complex/dynamic 
systems (e.g., Thagard & Nerb, 2002), such as agent-based modelling (e.g., Smith & 
Conrey, 2007). At a basic level, such techniques allow complex interactions between 
large numbers of autonomous agents within an environment – and their interactions 
with their environment – to be modelled over time.  As these advocates point out, this 
has major advantages over what Smith and Conrey (2007) term variable-based 
modelling  (the more traditional covariance-based approach described briefly above), 
including that it allows the incorporation of qualitative effects, such as a threshold point 
at which an individual agent switches behaviour.  
Approaches such as agent-based modelling clearly show the availability of 
analytic techniques that can help to address the issues raised thus far in this paper, 
signalling that theories of collective action that do directly address qualitative 
transformations are not placed beyond the bounds of quantitative analysis.  Indeed, 
agent-based modelling is championed as a tool of theory development, in the sense that 
it allows examination of dynamics and outcomes that emerge over time given a specific 
set of parameters. That is, it is an inductive enterprise that is shaped by the assumptions 
and descriptions that are used to define the parameters of a model, for example through 
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the production of cognitive-affective maps (Thagard, 2010; see Schröder & Thagard, 
2013 for an example). There is therefore a significant caveat to the potential value of 
complex modelling techniques when it comes to accounting for the points of transition 
identified here: The quality of such models is only as good as the quality of the inputs, 
in terms of measurement and in terms of conceptualisation and description (see 
Bonabeau, 2002). Indeed, the development of appropriate inputs and parameters within 
such models can involve drawing on embedded, ‘thick’ descriptions of phenomena 
using techniques such as participant observation and interviews, or detailed descriptive 
surveys. This again leaves us with important conceptual and descriptive work to do 
regarding the nature of collective action and protest, and the place of qualitative 
transformation within them. 
As a starting point, it is worth noting that the principle that quantitative variation 
translates into qualitative transformation is also recognisable in strands of philosophy, 
and particularly as a principle of Hegel’s (1830/2009) dialectical reasoning, later 
developed by Engels as the second principle of dialectical materialism. The utility of the 
principle of quantity-into-quality in explaining social change is tied to another of the 
principles of dialectics, one which resonates with a number of the scientific and social 
scientific approaches mentioned above. The principle is that any object of study – say, 
the climate, or the relationship between different individuals or between different 
groups – is best conceptualised as a system or process that consists of a set of opposing 
forces. Stability or stasis in that system therefore does not necessarily indicate the 
absence of factors that would precipitate change, such as the perceptions of illegitimacy 
that might instigate collective action (see Stewart, Leach, & Pratto, 2013). Rather, these 
factors are neutralised by countervailing forces; for example, emotions such as fear 
(Miller et al., 2009), or practical barriers to collective organisation or expression 
(Klandermans, 1997). The reason that the accumulation of quantitative changes can lead 
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to qualitative transformations – when people act on their perceived illegitimacy – is that 
at a certain point, the quantitative change breaks the equilibrium between the opposing 
forces, allowing abrupt change to occur in the system as one force suddenly 
overwhelms the other, at least until new, countervailing forces emerge in response to the 
abrupt change. This philosophy of change is applied quite directly in the theory of 
punctuated equilibria, as noted earlier. In fact, while primarily concerned with questions 
within evolutionary biology, the quote from Gould (1987) at the beginning of this 
article offers an agenda for studying change that should resonate with collective action 
researchers, as part of “a holistic vision that views change as interaction among 
components of complete systems, and sees the components themselves not as a priori 
entities, but as both products and inputs to the system.” (p154).  
A practical agenda for the social psychology of collective action 
In this final section, I want to take these principles forward into a slightly more 
practical research agenda. The first point relates to how external forces, such as an event 
that evokes a sense of illegitimacy and anger, not only affect the intra-psychic world of 
individuals who form a ‘mobilisation potential’ (Klandermans, 1997), but also affects 
how individuals relate to and interact with one another. Accordingly, an increasing 
amount of research in social psychology is acknowledging that communication between 
individuals is crucial to understanding the way in which collective action pans out 
(Livingstone, Spears, Manstead, Bruder, & Shepherd, 2011; Smith & Postmes, 2009; 
Thomas, McGarty & Mavor, 2009; Van Zomeren et al., 2004, 2012). Importantly, a 
shared sense of social identity not only shapes our orientations to one another through 
initial definitions of ‘us’ and ‘them’, but in turn changes as a result of communication 
as people engage in shared meaning-making.  
While the importance of communication in this dynamic is increasingly being 
addressed, it is also important to acknowledge that one of the barriers to genuinely 
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shared representations and co-ordinated action is that precipitating events happen to and 
are experienced differently by different individuals. This is true even in dramatic and 
intense events such as a police baton charge against a group of protestors: not everyone 
will be hit, and even those who do get hit will vary in whether they have had previous 
experiences of such events, or whether it is a shockingly new experience. At the same 
point in time, many others a short distance away will not even be aware that a baton 
charge has begun (Stott, Adang, Livingstone, & Schreiber, 2007). The result is that a 
‘given’ event can create asymmetries in the experiences and understandings of people 
who are involved. The extent to which particular points of transition into action are 
reached – the point at which one flees in fear, or collectively resists – will therefore be a 
function of whether shared representations and identity emerge in situ that both explain 
and provide a basis for acting in that context. As research on crowd behaviour has 
shown, the emergence of particular forms of action – a qualitative change in the nature 
of a collective’s behaviour – is unlikely in the absence of shared identity and 
representations; but can emerge dramatically when such shared representations do 
develop (Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2005). Thus, the emergence of action is tied to 
transformations in self-definition. Consequently, getting a handle on the emergence of 
action requires conceptualising and studying identity as a process that is dynamically 
related to unfolding events, not just as a discrete, abstracted input or output. 
The preceding discussion also makes it clear that the emergence of collective 
action, both at the level of the individual and the group, is a process that is embedded 
within wider, ongoing intergroup relations. This being the case, and in light of the 
review of catastrophe theory above, the second suggestion is to develop a psychology of 
key events or points in a dynamic – what may be termed points of phase transition – as 
well as of more abstracted perceptions over time. The importance of specific events is 
clearly acknowledged in many studies of collective action, both as precipitating factors 
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that instigate appraisals and emotions (e.g., Iyer et al., 2007), or as intervening factors 
that affect appraisals and emotions across different time points (Tausch et al., 2011). 
However psychological impactful these events may be, they are nevertheless still treated 
as something of a black box whose specific dynamic and content is not an object of 
study in itself. What is it about the specific event – materially, temporally, and 
psychologically – that saw people shift from inaction to action, or between different 
forms of action? Put more simply, what actually happened? 
The importance of such an enterprise is brought into focus by another principle 
that has been central to research on crowd behaviour (e.g., Drury et al., 1999): That one 
group’s actions create specific material contexts within which another group can (re)act, 
facilitating or inhibiting actions that may have or have not occurred otherwise (see also 
Kriesi, 2007). As Reicher and Stott (2011) have argued in relation to the riots in 
England in 2011, more abstracted psychological predictors such as illegitimacy, threat, 
anger and so forth are clearly necessary for the transition to action at an individual and a 
collective level, but understanding when and how that happens also requires a focus on 
how specific events, such as the nature of a police intervention in a particular situation, 
opens up the material possibilities for these worldviews to be enacted.  
Conclusion 
In simple terms, the aim of this paper has been to signal an important blind spot 
in social psychological models of collective action, and to provide some impetus 
towards addressing this shortfall. There were three aspects to this. The first was a 
recognition that the emergence of collective action (or any action) involves 
discontinuous change or transition as well as smooth, continuous variation, and that this 
is not sufficiently acknowledged in analyses that solely focus on shared variance 
between predictors and collective action outcomes. The second was to draw out the 
principles that (1) transitions can conceivably be mapped on to underlying quantitative 
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change, but only if those transitions are fully acknowledged and appropriately 
conceptualised; and (2) that an appropriate conceptualisation of such transformations 
involves seeing social change as a process or system composed of opposing forces that 
at any point may negate (producing stability) or overwhelm (producing sharp change) 
one another (see Smith & Conrey, 2007; Stewart et al., 2013). The third step was to 
advocate a social psychology of points of transition; that is, the study of in situ moments 
of change within and between individuals, and between interacting groups. Hopefully 
these straightforward, incremental changes in theory and practice can edge us towards 
understanding the transformative change that characterises the world around us. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Van Zomeren et al.’s (2008) social identity model of collective action 
(SIMCA). The path weights are standardized effect sizes estimated from their 
meta-analysis. 
Figure 2. Scherer’s (2000) illustration of hysteresis in the relationship between anger 
and frustration. The dotted portion of the curve is ‘inaccessible’, in that no 
actual observations occur on it. The arrows represent points at which there is a 
‘jump’ (sharp increase or decrease) in anger as a function of frustration. 
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